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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2014, several riots in the Manus Islands detention center
left a twenty-three year old Iranian refugee, Reza Barati, dead.1 Eyewitness
reports suggest that Barati had been beaten, he had been hit with a nail
embedded stick. A rock was also lifted and thrown down on his head,2 and
he eventually succumbed to these injuries. This horrific incident is not the
only tragedy to emerge from Australia’s policy of mandatory offshore
detention in a camp on a small Pacific settlement miles from the mainland.
On this day, not only Barati suffered; witnesses to his murder have since
been forced into solitary confinement, threatened, and tortured.3
Additionally, thousands of refugees and asylum seekers have been returned
to countries from which they initially fled. Members of the Tamil minority
of Sri Lanka, specifically, have been returned to their island state to face
ongoing persecution and human rights abuses.4
This Note analyzes whether Australia’s asylum procedures concerning nonrefoulement5 and the offshore detention facilities located on Nauru and the
Manus Islands in Papua New Guinea violate the 1987 U.N. Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Convention or CAT). Part II of this Note will lay the foundation and
background information concerning the specific incidents to be analyzed. Part
III of this Note will focus on the relevant jurisprudence regarding the various
interpretations of the CAT. This Part will specifically analyze two issues; first,
what exactly constitutes “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment”6 which is barred by the Convention, and second what is the role

1
Oliver Laughland, Manus Violence: Dead Asylum Seeker Named as Iranian Reza Barati,
23, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/manus-de
ad-asylum-seeker-iranian-reza-berati.
2
Kerry Brewster & Deb Richards, Manus Island Riot: Asylum Seeker Speaks of Witnessing
Reza Barati’s Death, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2014-04-04/manus-island-asylum-seekers-witness-statements-reza-berati-death/5367118.
3
Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment), Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ¶¶ 23–26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/Add. 1 (Mar.
5, 2015) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur].
4
Id. ¶¶ 20–22.
5
According to non-refoulement, a state may not return or extradite an individual to another
state when there is a substantial risk that the individual may face persecution or the violation
of human rights. Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Human Rights, BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 50,
at III.E-50 (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), http://www.asil.org/benchbook/humanrights.pdf.
6
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, arts. 1, 16 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture].
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of the Convention in preventing non-refoulement.7 Part IV of this Note will
apply the relevant jurisprudence in an effort to determine whether Australia
violates the Convention either through the conditions of its offshore detention
facilities or through the practice of returning Sri Lankan asylum seekers. As
an aside, this Note acknowledges that several other treaties, mainly the United
Nations Charter,8 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,9 the 1951
Refugee Convention10 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,11 are pertinent to this issue, but will not be analyzed in relation to the
incidents discussed in this Note.
II. THE PROBLEMS AND INSTANCES
There are many factors that contribute to the ill treatment and refoulement
of refugees. Further, numerous reported instances of human rights abuses
exist. The most pertinent problem is Australia’s lack of a Bill of Rights in its
Constitution. The murder of Reza Berati, as well as the return of Sri Lankan
asylum seekers to Sri Lanka are two of the most highly publicized depictions
of the ill treatment of refugees.
A. Australia’s Lack of a Bill of Rights or a Charter of Rights
Australia has no Bill of Rights to ensure basic liberties of Australian
citizens and individuals within Australian territory.12 One State in this
federally organized country, the State of Victoria, has passed a Charter of
Rights; however, only Victoria is bound by its terms.13 Australia’s rules of
construction concerning legislation are statutory in nature; “statutes are to be
read consistently with the rules of international law, but not where the clear
words of the statute are inconsistent with that implication.”14 Australian
legislation and statutes are automatically assumed to be in compliance with
international law and Australia’s international obligations. Despite this rule

7

Id. art. 3.
U.N. Charter.
9
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
10
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention on Refugees].
11
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
12
Jim Kennan S.C., The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian Law, 44
VAL. U. L. REV. 895, 895 (2010).
13
Id.
14
Id.
8
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of construction, Australian courts have not readily adopted the principles of
international law in their common law.15
B. The Road to Offshore Detention Centers
Australia first began the policy of mandatory offshore detention facilities
with the Migration Amendment Act of 1992. The Act was implemented by
the Keating government16 and called for the mandatory detention of all
immigrants who tried to enter Australia without authorization.17 In 2001, the
Howard government took matters further after the so-called “Tampa
Affair”18 by implementing the “Pacific Solution.”19 The Pacific Solution
encompassed at least seven new bills pertaining to refugees, including the:
Border Protections (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act of 2001;
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act of 2001;
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential
Provisions) Act of 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial
Review) Act of 1998, passed in 2001; the Migration Legislation Amendment
Act (No. 1) of 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 5) of 2001;
and the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) of 2001.20 These new
15

Id. See also Mary Crock, Shadow Plays, Shifting Sands and International Refugee Law
Convergences in the Asia-Pacific, 63 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 247 (2014).
16
Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.); Kaitlyn Pennington-Hill, Australia Makes
a U-Turn With the Revival of the Pacific Solution: Should Asylum Seekers Find a New
Destination?, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 585, 589 (2014).
17
Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.).
18
The MV Tampa was a Norwegian cargo ship that rescued 443 asylum seekers in distress
just 140 kilometers off the coast of Christmas Island at the request of the Rescue Coordination
Centre of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. The Australian government subsequently
denied the Tampa authority to enter Australian waters. Concerned about the severe
overcrowding on the ship, horrible sanitary conditions, and asylum seekers in need of medical
care, the Captain of the Tampa entered Australian waters regardless. The Australian Special
Air Services subsequently boarded the ship and prohibited passengers from disembarking.
The incident concluded with 134 refugees being granted asylum by the government of New
Zealand and the rest of the refugees being forcibly removed to Nauru while their asylum
claims were being processed. See William Kirtley, The Tampa Incident: The Legality of
Ruddock v. Vadarlis Under International Law and the Implications of Australia’s New Asylum
Policy, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 251, 253–59 (2002) for a more detailed account of the
facts pertaining to the Tampa Affair and its repercussions.
19
Alexander J. Wood, The “Pacific Solution”: Refugees Unwelcome in Australia, 9 No. 3
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 22, 22 (2002).
20
Border Protections (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act of 2001 (Cth) (Austl.);
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth)
(Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) (Austl.);
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Migration Legislation
Amendment Act (No. 5) 2001 (Cth) (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6)
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bills were a “calculated attempt to discourage and punish refugees who
followed an indirect route from their country of origin to Australia and who
had access to protection in their regions of origin prior to embarking for
Australia.”21
Perhaps the most important of these acts was the Migration Amendment
(Excision From Migration Zone) Act, because it essentially established that
“Christmas, Ashmore, Cartier, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands were excised
from Australia’s migration zone,”22 meaning that migrants who reach these
designated areas were deemed outside of Australia’s territory and thus owed
no duty of care by Australia. Previously, these islands were deemed to be
Australian territory. Therefore, migrants reaching these islands were
afforded the same rights they would have received if they had arrived to the
Australian mainland.23 Migrants unlawfully entering these areas were unable
to apply for visas to enter Australia except at the discretion of the Minister.24
In 2008, the Pacific Solution formally ended25 but resurfaced in 2012.26
Before reenacting the Pacific Solution, the Australian government
unsuccessfully attempted to procure the so-called ‘Malaysian Solution’27 in
2011. This arrangement purported to transfer 800 Australian irregular
maritime arrivals (IMA) to Malaysia in exchange for the resettlement of
4,000 refugees from Malaysia.28 This non-binding arrangement was
successfully challenged as a violation of the Migration Act of 1958 in
Plaintiff M70 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.29 In its 2011
decision, the Australian High Court emphasized the fact that Malaysia was
“not a party to the U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or to
any of the core human rights treaties,” as reasoning for striking down the
agreement.30 Essentially, the 800 Australian IMAs could have been subject
to inhumane treatment and not afforded the rights they would have received
2001 (Cth) (Austl.). See also Catherine Skulan, Australia’s Mandatory Detention of
“Unauthorized” Asylum Seekers: History, Politics, and Analysis Under International Law, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 61, 73–74 (2006).
21
Skulan, supra note 20, at 73–74.
22
Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 594.
23
Id.
24
Id. Additionally, this legislation was challenged as being unconstitutional in Plaintiff
M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 41 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia affirmed
the constitutionality of the Act.
25
Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 585.
26
Crock, supra note 15, at 256–66.
27
Id. at 264–65.
28
Id.
29
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144
(Austl.).
30
Crock, supra note 15, at 265.
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in Australia because Australia is a signatory to several human rights treaties
of which Malaysia is not.31
After the failure of the Malaysia Solution, the Migration Legislation
Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act of 2012
established a regional processing scheme once more.32 The purpose of this
2012 Act was to distance the Australian courts from refugee claims made by
illegal maritime arrivals.33 The Department of Immigration and Border
Protection of the Australian government defines “illegal maritime arrivals”
as any individual who arrived to Australia illegally by boat.34 The Migration
Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals) Act of 2013 further denied
any unauthorized maritime arrivals the “right to seek asylum or to apply for
any form of visa in Australia.”35 Yet another statute, the Maritime Powers
Act of 2013,36 expanded the power of Australian authorities to intercept
boats at sea and board, seize, search, and detain all individuals and vessels.
Authorities are also permitted to “board vessels, and require the person in
charge to stop, manoeuvre or adopt a specified course.”37
Following the return of the Pacific Solution, the Australian government
began the process of entering into several ‘Regional Resettlement
Arrangements’ and ‘Memoranda of Understandings’ with various states.38
The regional resettlement agreements imply that irregular maritime arrivals
arriving to Australia by boat will essentially never have the opportunity to
settle in Australia because they will be immediately transferred to an
offshore detention facility and will be unable to apply for a protection visa in
Australia.39 Australia’s memoranda of understanding with Nauru, a
sovereign state in the South Pacific, states that the government of Nauru will
settle individuals who are found to be in need of international protection.40
31

Id.
Id. at 265–67.
33
Id.
34
Illegal Maritime Arrivals, http://www.ima.border.gov.au/en/illegal-maritime-arrivals.
35
Crock, supra note 15, at 249.
36
Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).
37
Natalie Klein, Assessing Australia’s Push Back the Boats Policy under International
Law: Legality and Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants, 15 MELB.
J. INT’L L. 414, 439–40; Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).
38
Crock, supra note 15.
39
As of August 2015, over 1,000 men are still being detained at the Manus Island facility.
Many of these individuals have been detained for over two years and are genuine refugees by
United Nations’ standards. Transfer of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries, https://www.hum
anrights.gov.au/our-work/asylum-seekers-and-refugees/projects/transfer-asylum-seekers-third
-countries [hereinafter Transfer of Asylum Seekers]; see also Liam Cochrane, Goodbye,
Manus: A Beautiful Island in the Shadow of a Detention Centre, http://www.abc.net.au/am/co
ntent/2015/s4302534.htm.
40
Transfer of Asylum Seekers, supra note 39; see also Crock, supra note 15, at 3.
32
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In Nauru, irregular maritime arrivals are given “an Australian Regional
Processing Visa valid for an initial period of three months, renewable
indefinitely as long as the Australian government continues to pay the $1000
monthly visa charge.”41 Likewise, the memoranda of understanding with
Papau New Guinea establishes that irregular maritime arrivals who arrive
after July 19, 2013, will be transferred and have their asylum claims
processed in and under the laws of Papua New Guinea.42 However, there is
“no visa equivalent to the Australian Regional Processing Visa,”43 in Papua
New Guinea. This means that refugees on Papua New Guinea, “remain
without status, and are simply tolerated by the government in fulfilment of its
diplomatic promises to Australia.”44 One problem with these agreements is
that they were written in non-binding language and contain little to no human
rights provisions.45
Additionally in 2013, the Australian government engaged in efforts to
essentially push back boats en route to Australia with the initiation of the
Operation Sovereign Borders.46 As Natalie Klein explains, “[t]his policy
involves Australian officials preventing the passage of vessels carrying
irregular migrants so they are unable to reach Australian territory.”47 Under
these various agreements and government acts, any unauthorized refugee or
asylum seeker arriving to Australia by boat will be removed to one of these
offshore detention facilities and will never be given the chance to resettle in
Australia.
As of August 31, 2015, 1,589 individuals were being detained at the
Manus Island and the Nauru detention centers.48 The average detainment
time for these individuals was 412 days.49 To date “Australia defends its

41

Crock, supra note 15, at 272.
Transfer of Asylum Seekers, supra note 39 (this arrangement has also been referred to as
the “PNG Solution”); see also Azadeh Dastyari, Detention of Australia’s Asylum Seekers in
Nauru: Is Deprivation of Liberty by Any Other Name Just as Unlawful?, 38 U. N.S.W. L.J.
669, 672 (2015) (explaining that individuals who will be transferred to Nauru consist of those
“who a) have travelled irregularly by sea to Australia; or b) have been intercepted by
Australian authorities in the course of trying to reach Australia by irregular maritime means;
and c) are authorised by Australian law to be transferred to Naura; and d) have undergone
short health, security and identity checks in Australia”).
43
Crock, supra note 15, at 272.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 276.
46
Klein, supra note 37, at 415.
47
Id.
48
Detention and Refugee Statistics, ASYLUM SEEKER RESOURCE CTR., http://www.asrc.org.
au/resources/statistics/detention-and-refugee-statistics/.
49
Id.
42
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policy of mandatory detention of unauthorized asylum seekers pursuant to its
sovereign power to enact laws to protect its borders.”50
C. The Murder of Reza Barati
Reza Barati was a twenty-three year-old Iranian immigrant who arrived in
Australia on July 24, 2013; only five days shy of obtaining the opportunity to
be resettled in Australia.51 Because Barati arrived after July 19, 2013, he was
unable to request asylum in Australia due to Australia’s memorandum of
understanding with Papua New Guinea, and was subsequently transferred to
the Manus Island detention center in Papua New Guinea.52 The two-day
riots in February 2014 that plagued the Manus Island detention center can be
attributed to several factors: “increasing tension in the centre and the
transferees’ frustration and anxiety caused by anger at being [brought] to
Papua New Guinea,” delays in processing times of refugee status, and the
lack of information concerning the transferees’ length stay at the detention
center.53 Additionally, the increasingly militarized conditions in the
detention centers did not aid the escalating tensions.54
Along with the injuries Barati obtained during the riots, several other
detainees were shot or beaten, and one man had his throat cut with a knife.55
Joshua Kaluvia and Louie Efi, local workers at the detention center, were the
only two people charged in the murder of Reza Barati, though eyewitnesses
reported that several Australian expatriates participated in Reza’s beatings as
well.56

50

Pennington-Hill, supra note 16, at 596.
Laughland, supra note 1.
52
Id.
53
Morrison Releases Manus Island Riot Report, SBS (June 3, 2014), http://www.sbs.com.
au/news/article/2014/05/27/morrison-releases-manus-island-riot-report.
54
The Manus Island detention facility is a former WWII military base surrounded by
locked gates and armed guards. Locked fences and armed security guards also surround each
living compound inside the facility. Amnesty International, This is Breaking People: Human
Rights Violations At Australia’s Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua
New Guinea, 36–38 (2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA12/002/2013/en/.
See also Skulan, supra note 20, at 91–92 (restating a description by a Human Rights and
Equal Opportunities Commission Report that Australian detention centers impose
“unreasonable restrictions on the movement of detainees; limited recreational and educational
opportunities; over-crowding and lack of privacy; inadequate . . . lighting and
ventilation . . . and a lack of health care services”).
55
Brewster & Richards, supra note 2.
56
Ben Doherty, Men Accused of Reza Barati’s Death in Manus Detention Centre Stand
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/
21/men-accused-of-reza-baratis-death-in-manus-detention-centre-stand-trial.
51
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In March 2015, the U.N. Human Rights Council condemned the Australian
government, asserting that the government’s response to an inquiry by the
Special Rapporteur concerning the ill treatment and torture of two detainees
who witnessed the violent events that occurred at the Manus Island detention
facility on February 16 to 18 in 2014, was insufficient.57 In its November
2014 inquiry, the Special Rapporteur addressed pressing concerns about the
status of two detainees who had been “tied . . . to chairs and
threatened . . . with physical violence, rape and criminal prosecution . . . if they
refused to retract the statements that they had made to the Royal Papua New
Guinea Constabulary and to G4S regarding the violent attacks,” that occurred
at the Manus Island detention center in February 2014.58 Furthermore, these
two unnamed refugees were reported to have repeatedly been forced to sleep
on the floor with only bread and water to eat.59 These witnesses received
multiple death threats and were consistently targeted by guards at the Manus
Island detention center for abuse.60 One eyewitness, Barait’s roommate and a
Kurdish refugee by the name of Benham Satah, was forcibly taken to testify
against Joshua Kaluvia and Louie Efi, who were charged with the murder of
Reza Barati.61 Satah initially refused, but later agreed, to testify only under the
promise by a judge of enhanced protection.62 No action was brought against
any of the Australian expatriates who were employed at the Manus Island
detention center at the time of the attack.63
At the time of the February 2014 riots, both the Manus Island and the
Nauru detention centers were operated by a private security firm, G4S.64
Previously known as ‘GSL,’ the firm had a history of detention center abuse

57

Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 3.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates of the Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression; the
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the Chair-Rapporteur of the
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries; the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants; and the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Nov. 17, 2014), https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28th/public_-_ua_aus
tralia_17.11.14_(4.2014)_pro.pdf.
59
Id.
60
Ben Doherty, Witness in Reza Barati Murder Trial Says He is Dogged by Death Threats,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/23/wit
ness-in-reza-barati-trial-says-he-is-dogged-by-death-threats.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Jamie Smyth & Gill Plimmer, G4S to Hand Over Australia Asylum Centre Contract to
Transfield, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/ef5bf766-9d24-11e3-a59
9-00144feab7de.
58
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at the time it contracted with the Australian government in 2012.65 In 2013,
G4S declined to comply with a Freedom of Information request put forth by
Guardian Australia, an online version of the British-print newspaper The
Guardian.66 The reports requested by Guardian Australia were mandated by
the Australian Department of Immigration to be submitted at the close of
every month in order to assess and oversee the operations of the detention
center.67 Guardian Australia reported that the reports in question did not
actually exist and that G4S was failing in its obligation to report the
conditions of the detention centers.68 Following the Manus Island riots,
Australia’s contract with G4S was terminated, and the Nauru and Manus
Island detention centers have since been run by Transfield Services under a
contract for $1.2 billion lasting twenty months.69
D. The Return of the Tamil Population to Sri Lanka
In July 2014, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants and
the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment voiced their concerns about Australia’s policy and
decisions regarding two sets of Sri Lankan asylum seekers.70 The first set of
people were members of the Tamil population from Sri Lanka and were
65

Jay Fletcher, Notorious Firm G4S to Run Refugee Prison Camp on Manus Island, GREEN
LEFT WKLY. (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/notorious-firm-g4s-runrefugee-prison-camp-manus-island. A 2005 inquiry into the firm uncovered that GSL did not
provide psychiatric care to mentally ill detainees and detained a three-year old for her entire
life. The company was also faulted with multiple reports of abuse and the deaths of numerous
individuals under its care.
66
Paul Farrell & Oliver Laughland, G4S and Serco Fail to Report on Australia’s Asylum
Centre Conditions, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/20
13/sep/16/g4s-serco-australia-asylum-centre.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Ben Doherty, Tansfield Named Coalition’s ‘Preferred Tenderer’ for Manus and Nauru
Centers, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/31/tr
ansfield-named-coalitions-preferred-tenderer-for-manus-and-nauru-centres. Transfield Services
is not without its fair share of discomforting allegations. The staff of Transfield Services has
been accused of rape and sexual assault on detainees, and Transfield Services’ bosses refused to
answer detailed questions concerning the conditions at the detention centers during a Senate
hearing. Additionally, subcontractors of Transfield Services have been accused of “handcuffing
children . . . assaulting asylum seekers who were handcuffed, and running a secret solitary
confinement facility on Manus.”
70
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mandates of the Special Rapporteur
on the Human Rights of Migrants and the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (July 8, 2014), https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28t
h/public_-_ua_australia_08.07.14_(2.2014).pdf [hereinafter Mandates of the Special Rapporteur
on Torture]. See also Klein, supra note 37, at 415.
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traveling to Christmas Island, an island territory of Australia,71 when they
were intercepted on June 29, 2014, by Australian authorities.72 It was not
until legal action was brought against the Australian government on July 7,
2014, in a case entitled CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection73 that the government finally admitted to detaining the refugees at
sea.74 The anonymous plaintiff in the case was a Sri Lankan of the Tamil
minority who had originally fled to India to escape persecution due to his
political involvements while living in Sri Lanka.75 Detained at sea for
roughly a month, these asylum seekers were housed in a windowless room
with roughly eighty other people for twenty-two hours.76 They were finally
brought to the Australian mainland via the Cocos Islands, and “with the legal
team urgently requesting permission to visit them, they were secretively
taken with no warning to Australia’s detention centre on Nauru in an
overnight flight.”77
The second boat of asylum seekers was no luckier than the first. This
boat, containing fifty Sri Lankan asylum seekers, was intercepted by
Australian vessels. These asylum seekers were subjected to an expedited
screening process “involving a single, four-question interview conducted on
the high seas without any legal assistance.”78 Although 50% to 90%79 of
people leaving Sri Lanka for Australia are in genuine need of protection,
forty-one out of the fifty on this boat were handed over to “Sri Lankan
authorities during a transfer at sea.”80 Since 2012,81 Sri Lankans are the only
71

Id.
Human Rights Law Centre, High Court Finds High Seas Detention of 157 Asylum
Seekers Did Not Breach Australian Domestic Law (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.hrlc.org.au/hu
man-rights-case-summaries/high-court-finds-high-seas-detention-of-157-asylum-seekers-didnot-breach-australian-domestic-law [hereinafter High Court Finds High Seas Detention of 157
Asylum Seekers Did Not Breach Australian Domestic Law].
73
CPCF v Immigration for Minister and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1 (Austl.).
74
High Court Finds High Seas Detention of 157 Asylum Seekers Did Not Breach Australian
Domestic Law, supra note 72.
75
Id.
76
Ben Doherty & Paul Farrell, Detention of 157 Tamil asylum seekers on board ship ruled
lawful, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/austra
lia-returns-asylum-seekers-to-sri-lanka-what-happens-next.
77
Id.
78
Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 70.
79
Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay: Australia’s Interception and Return of Sri Lankan Asylum
Seekers, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE (Mar. 2014), http://www.australianchurchesrefugee
taskforce.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/HRLC_SriLanka_Report_11March2014.pdf
[hereinafter Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay].
80
Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 70; see Oliver Laughland, Paul
Farrell & Melissa Davey, Australia Returns Asylum Seekers to Sri Lanka: What Happens Next?,
THE GUARDIAN (July 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/australia-returnsasylum-seekers-to-sri-lanka-what-happens-next.
72
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group to be exposed to this so-called ‘enhanced screening’82 without a
lawyer. Enhanced screening consists of a four-question interview by two
officers from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship83 and is not
subject to review by any other authorities.84 Screened individuals are
immediately returned to Sri Lanka if they are not determined to be at risk of
being tortured or subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in Sri Lanka.85 Additionally, “three Sri Lankan Tamil asylum
seekers on temporary visas in Australia, facing the prospect of being returned
to Sri Lanka, have set themselves on fire, [and] two of them died.”86
Though the thirty-year civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) separatists and the Sri Lankan government ended in 2009, the
Tamil minority still faces serious human rights abuses and persecution.87 The
LTTE was an organization with the goal of obtaining a “Tamil homeland in
the Tamil-majority areas in the north and east of the country.”88 During the
end of the civil war in 2009, over 40,000 civilians lost their lives, with
atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict.89 The LTTE allegedly used
human shields, recruited children for combat, and reportedly killed civilians
who attempted to leave areas controlled by the LTTE.90 The United Nations
reported that Sri Lankan government forces “deliberately targeted and shelled
thousands of civilians, persecuted the population and intimidated journalists
seeking to cover the war.”91 President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka and
his brothers control roughly 45% to 70% of the Sri Lankan economy,
according to the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice.92
Even though the civil war has ended, Navi Pillay, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, said after a visit to Sri Lanka in 2013
that she was “deeply concerned that Sri Lanka, despite the opportunity
81
Australian Human Rights Commission, Tell Me About It: The ‘Enhanced Screening
Process’ (June 13, 2013), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publ
ication/enhanced-screening.pdf [hereinafter Tell Me About It: The Enhanced Screening Process].
82
This enhanced screening includes interviewing Sri Lankan refugees without legal
representation or “access to legal advice or information about their rights.” Additionally this
process disallows Sri Lankan asylum seekers the proper avenue to put forth a claim for
asylum. Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 5.
83
Tell Me About It: The Enhanced Screening Process, supra note 81, at 1.
84
Id. at 2.
85
Id. at 1.
86
Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, supra note 70.
87
Id.
88
Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 14.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. (citing Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri
Lanka (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf).
92
Id. at 15.
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provided by the end of the war to construct a new vibrant all-embracing
state, is showing signs of heading in an increasingly authoritarian
direction.”93 Pillay also reported widespread harassment of lawyers and
intimidation geared towards journalists and human rights defenders.94 In
January 2013, for example, the Sri Lankan Chief Justice had been ousted
after handing down judicial decisions that “did not favour the central
Government.”95 To make matters worse, lawmakers passed the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which removed presidential term
limits and granted the president further powers to “appoint judges and senior
appointees to independent bodies such as the Police Commission, Human
Rights Commission, and the Elections Commission.”96
In Sri Lanka, it is illegal to leave the country without departing from an
authorized port.97 Sri Lankan law enforcement continuously monitors and
intercepts people attempting to leave, while the Sri Lankan Navy “conducts
on-water interception of boats and takes the passengers to a nearby base.”98
Australia has aided in Sri Lanka’s efforts to stop asylum seekers from
leaving the country by providing millions of dollars to the Sri Lankan Navy,
as well as a “$2 million gift of two patrol boats to the Sri Lankan Navy,
ostensibly to be used for ‘humanitarian purposes’ to ‘ensure the safety of life
at sea.’ ”99 This aid has come pursuant to a 2009 Memorandum of
Understanding aimed at “preventing and responding to migrant smuggling
and related activity.”100

93
Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening remarks at a press
conference during her mission to Sri Lanka Colombo (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx?NewsID=13673; see also Sri Lanka Campaign for
Peace and Justice, The Rajapaksas: keeping it in the family, INFOGRAPHIC, http://1.bp.blogsp
ot.com/-llj21DHtNvY/UoiIjldpOI/AAAAAAAAAWY/4GeUkUYXzOM/s1600/sri+figure_2
0.03.13.jpg.
94
Id.
95
Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 15.
96
PARLIAMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA: EIGHTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (Sept. 2010), http://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitutio
n/18th_amendment_act.pdf (citing Oral update of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on
promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka’, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/CRP.3/Rev.1, 23
Sept. 2013, ¶ 26, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session24/Docum
ents/A-HRC-24-CRP-3-Rev1_en.doc).
97
Can’t Flee, Can’t Stay, supra note 79, at 34.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 25.
100
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the
Government of Sri Lanka concerning Legal Cooperation against the Smuggling of Migrants
(Nov. 9, 2009) (on file with the HRLC).
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As of August 2014, over 1,000 Sri Lankan Tamils who sought asylum in
Australia have been returned to Sri Lanka.101 With the increasing number of
irregular maritime arrivals, this number will most likely increase rather than
decrease, which may lead to an increase in refoulement.
III. APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment entered into force on June 26, 1987. The overt
purpose of the Convention is “to make more effective the struggle against
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
throughout the world.”102 By joining the Convention, state parties obligated
themselves to impose “formal and non-formal arrangements at the domestic
level to prevent torture from occurring within the state and its territories.”103
Territorial waters, excised migration zones, exclusive economic zones, as
well as flag-flying ships and aircraft are all deemed to be “territories” for
purposes of the CAT.104 As a state party since 1989, Australia is bound by
the provisions of the CAT.105
The Committee Against Torture (The Committee), created by Article 17
of the Convention, oversees state adherence.106 The Committee is permitted
“to hear complaints by individuals of alleged violations of the treaty by states
parties that have recognized the Committee’s competence to consider these
disputes.”107 If the Committee Against Torture reliably learns of possible
101

Muditha Dias, How Bad is the Situation for Tamil Asylum Seekers in Sri Lanka?,
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/radionati
onal/programs/latenightlive/how-bad-is-the-situation-for-tamil-asylum-seekers-in-sri-lanka/5
650338.
102
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6.
103
Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, Reinforcing Refugee Protection in the Wake of the War of
Terror, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 277, 295 (2007). The General Comment states that
these domestic laws must be designed to protect all individuals, “regardless of race, colour,
ethnicity, age, religious belief . . . including persons accused of political offences or terrorist
acts, asylum-seekers, refugees or others under international protection, or any other status or
adverse distinction.” U.N. Office of the High Comm’n on Human Rights, Comm. Against
Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008).
104
Odhiambo-Abuya, supra note 103.
105
Skulan, supra note 20, at 102.
106
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 17.1. See also Samuel L. David, A Foul
Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-Refoulement Obligation Under the
Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769, 773 (2003).
107
David, supra note 106, at 773. See also Julia Hall, The Convention’s Nonrefoulement
Obligation in the Context of the “War on Terror,” 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 46, 47 (2010)
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violations of the CAT, the Committee will ask for the cooperation of the
State in question “to submit observations with regard to the information
concerned.”108 The Committee is composed of ten experts “elected by secret
ballot from a list of persons submitted by Member States,”109 who serve for
four years110 and must “possess ‘high moral standing’ and ‘recognized
competence’ in the area of human rights.”111
It is also worth noting that pursuant to the CAT’s definition of torture,
the acts in question must have been “inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.”112 Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya in Reinforcing Refugee
Protection in the Wake of the War of Terror, pointed out that it would be
irrational to believe that “acts committed by State-controlled or Statesupported vigilante, death squads, or paramilitary groups will be prosecuted
domestically.”113 A state is said to acquiesce in torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment when the state “willingly
fails to take action to prevent its commission.”114
In a case before the Committee Against Torture in 1998, entitled G.R.B.
v. Sweden,115 the complainant claimed that refoulement to Peru would violate

(explaining that “forms of evidence that can be submitted include . . . mass violations of
human rights, the past torture of a person, medical evidence of that past torture or ill
treatment, changes on the ground since the person had been mistreated that indicate at this
point the person would be safer elsewhere”).
108
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 20.1.
109
Odhiambo-Abuya, supra note 103, at 282.
110
Id.
111
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 17.1.
112
Id. art. 1.1. But see David, supra note 106, at 774–79 for a discussion of three separate
cases explaining the various interpretations of what constitutes a person acting in an official
capacity. See also Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the
Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in the Torture of Its
Citizens?, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 603 (2005) (explaining, “the involvement of any level of
government official is strong evidence that the government has acquiesced in the torture.
Evidence of government officials’ participation in acts of torture should give rise to a strong
presumption that the government has acquiesced, regardless of the rank of the government
official”); see also David, supra note 106, at 804–05 (concluding that the non-refoulement
obligation under Article 3 of the CAT necessarily includes some non-state actors that operate
“outside of state control”).
113
Odhiambo-Ayuba, supra note 103, at 288.
114
Id. at 289. See also Hajrizi Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, Communication No. 161/2000,
Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 9.2 (finding that Yugoslavia acquiesced in the
torture of people of Romani origin because the police, “had been informed of the immediate
risk that the complainants were facing and had been present at the scene of the events [and]
did not take any appropriate steps in order to protect the complainants”).
115
G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture,
¶ 2.1 (1998).

684

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 45:669

Article 3 of the CAT on the basis that her and her family were part of the
Communist Party in Peru.116 The complainant claimed her parents had been
imprisoned by Peruvian authorities, that her father had been tortured, and
that she had been imprisoned and raped by “members of the Sendero
Luminoso, a guerilla group opposing the Peruvian government.”117 The
Committee Against Torture found for Sweden and reasoned that, “the issue
whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person
who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental entity,
without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the
scope [of] article 3 of the Convention.”118
The Committee moved away from its decision in G.R.B. v. Sweden in
1999 in the landmark case of Elmi v. Australia,119 in which the Committee
ruled that it would be a violation of Article 3 to return the complainant to
Somalia because, in the Committee’s words, he was at a substantial risk of
being tortured by “certain Somali clans rather than an actual government.”120
In this case, several warring factions in Somalia had established “quasigovernmental institutions.”121 The Committee wrote that “when private
persons exercise government functions they can be considered ‘public
officials or other persons acting in an official capacity.’ ”122 In 2001, the
Committee failed to follow its own decision in S.V. v. Canada123 when it
ruled that refoulement of Sri Lankans who claimed to be at risk of torture or
persecution by the Sri Lankan authorities and members of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam would not violate Article 3.124
Samuel L. David argues that travaux preparatoires of the Convention
Against Torture pointed to a broad interpretation of Article 3.125 Though the
main focus of the drafters of the CAT was torture carried out by states,
various working groups voiced their concerns and were “troubled by the
116

Id. See also David, supra note 106, at 774–75.
David, supra note 106, at 775; G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997,
Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 2.3 (1998).
118
David, supra note 106, at 775; G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No. 83/1997,
Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 6.5 (1998).
119
Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/1998, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture
(1999).
120
David, supra note 106, at 775.
121
Id. at 776.
122
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 1.
123
S.V. v. Canada, Communication No. 1827/2008, Decision, U.N. ICCPR Human Rights
Comm. (July, 23 2012).
124
David, supra note 106, at 777.
125
Id. at 785. Furthermore, the CAT was initially modeled after the Declaration on the
Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Declaration on Torture).
117
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omission of non-state actors from the original draft.”126 The final
compromise led to the current provision that includes “other person[s] acting
in an official capacity.”127
A. What Exactly Constitutes “Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment”
When most people think of torture, the first thought that may come to
mind is torture in the traditional sense. This may include “being whipped or
beaten to secure a confession,” or other forms of “exotic” physical abuse.128
Although torture is defined in the CAT as “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person,”129 the precise definition of what constitutes cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment remains unclear. Torture can include acts
used to obtain a confession from a third person, “punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,”130 or
intimidation.131 However, pain and suffering deriving from lawful acts or
sanctions cannot be considered torture under the CAT.132
Regarding inhuman treatment, the International Committee of the Red
Cross defined inhuman treatment as the infliction of “severe physical or
mental pain or suffering.”133 Mental suffering can include “keeping a strong
light on in a jail cell, playing loud music 24 hours a day, or constantly
awakening a person during the night.”134
Additionally, two decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia regarded inhuman treatment as any act “which ‘causes
serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack
on human dignity.’ ”135 For individuals in detention centers, lack of water,
food, and medical treatment as well as other poor conditions have all been
deemed to be inhuman treatment. This line of reasoning is consistent with
the 2014 decision of the Committee Against Torture in Kirsanov v. Russian
126

Id. at 786.
Id. at 788.
128
Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 210 (2003).
129
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 1.1.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 90. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule90 (citing Elements of
Crimes for the ICC, Definition of Inhuman Treatment as a War Crime (ICC Statute, Article
8(2)(a)(ii))) [hereinafter Rule 90].
134
Strauss, supra note 128, at 211.
135
Rule 90, supra note 133.
127

686

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 45:669

Federation.136 In that case, the Committee Against Torture found the
Russian Federation in violation of Article 16 of the CAT, along with several
other articles, due to the conditions that the complainant had endured in
detention. The Committee credited his allegations that he had been exposed
to other detainees who routinely smoked, that he was not allowed to leave his
cell to exercise, and that he was not given bedding or toiletry items during
his detention.137 The Committee further reported that although the
respondent state had detained the complainant for a prolonged period of
time, the conditions in which he was detained did not amount to “severe pain
and suffering”138 under the definition of Article 1 of the CAT concerning
torture. The Committee did find, however, that the detainment conditions
violated Article 16 of the CAT and amounted to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment.139
Furthermore, in a 2012 case, Fatou Sonko v. Spain, the Committee found
that by subjugating the complainant “to physical and mental suffering prior
to his death, aggravated by his particular vulnerability as a migrant,” the
state’s actions did “exceed the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, under the terms of Article 16 of the Convention.”140
The complainant was a Senegalese migrant attempting to reach Spain by
“swimming along the coast between Belionex and Benzu”141 with only a
wetsuit and a dinghy. He had been intercepted by Spanish Civil Guard
officers and was forced to jump into Moroccan territorial waters.142 While
hanging onto the rail of the vessel, the complainant repeatedly told the Civil
Guard officers that he could not swim.143 The officers forced him to let go of
the vessel, and he subsequently drowned.144 Although the Civil Guard
officers’ actions did not amount to torture under Article 1, the Committee
ruled and concluded that their actions were in violation of Article 16.145
Additionally, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment wrote that
136
Kirsanov v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 478/2011, Decision, U.N. CAT
Comm. Against Torture (May 14, 2014).
137
Id. ¶ 2.3.
138
Id. ¶ 11.2.
139
Id.
140
Fernando M. Marino Menendez, Recent Jurisprudence of the United Nations Committee
against Torture and the International Protection of Refugees, 34 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 61, 69
(2015).
141
Sonko v. Spain, Communication No. 368/2008, Decision, U.N. CAT Comm. Against
Torture, ¶ 10.4 (Nov. 25, 2011).
142
Id.
143
Id. ¶ 2.2.
144
Id.
145
Id. ¶ 10.4.
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organizations should focus on the “purpose of the conduct and the
powerlessness of the victim, rather than the intensity of the pain or suffering
inflicted.”146 The European Court of Human Rights set a minimum threshold
for circumstances that might amount to inhuman or degrading treatment in
1976 in Ireland v. United Kingdom.147 These circumstances include the
“duration of treatment; physical effects of treatment; mental effects of
treatment; and sex, age, and state of health of the victim.”148
B. What Constitutes “substantial grounds” in Deciding Refoulement
As well as prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, the CAT prohibits any state party from “return[ing]
(‘refouler’) or extradite[ing] a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”149 The non-refoulement provision also includes
situations where an individual is returned to a state and then transferred to
another state where the individual is at a substantial risk of torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.150 Mary Crock
pointed out that a “state cannot abdicate its responsibilities by deflecting
refugees to a State that will not comply with the terms”151 of human rights
treaties. Essentially, “what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.”152 Furthermore, the non-refoulement provisions of the CAT
apply to all individuals regardless of whether they have been deemed

146
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Interpretation of Torture in the
Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies, 1, 7 (2011), http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Torture/UNVFVT/Interpretation_torture_2011_EN.pdf
(citing
Manfred Nowak, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 20, 2005)).
147
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 376–79 (1976).
148
Interpretation of Torture in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International
Bodies, supra note 146, at 7.
149
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 3.1. See also Ktiti v. Morocco,
Communication No. 419/2010, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ ?? (2011);
Kalinichenko v. Morocco, Communication No. 428/2010, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against
Torture, ¶ ?? (2012).
150
David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights
Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) (citing Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication
No. 13/1993, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 45 (1994)).
151
Crock, supra note 15, at 275–76 (citing UNHCR Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 85
(1998); Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 87 (1999)).
152
Crock, supra note 15, at 275.
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refugees or asylum seekers,153 or whether they have entered a state legally or
illegally.154 The non-refoulement obligation also applies in a case of
extradition, although this raises possible conflicts with the commitments
states’ have made under extradition treaties.155 However, two key agents in
the drafting of the CAT, Herman Burgers and Hans Delenius, asserted that
after a state has ratified the CAT, the state “must refrain from assuming
obligations contrary to the objectives of the Convention.”156 The drafters
contended that the non-refoulement provision was so necessary they went as
far as suggesting that “even previously ratified extradition treaties may well
be construed to have been supplemented by the non-refoulement exception
provided in Article 3.”157 Additionally, “this obligation is considered a norm
of customary international law subject neither to limitations for national
security reasons nor to derogation in times of public emergency.”158
In 1997, the Committee Against Torture adopted various sets of
guidelines to aid in understanding exactly what constitutes “substantial
grounds”159 in deciding whether an individual would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.160 The Committee’s guidelines identified several factors
that are relevant to this analysis:
(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights (see Article 3, paragraph 2)?
(b) Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the
instigation of or with the consent of acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity in the
past? If so, was this the recent past?
(c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support
a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or
maltreated in the past? Has the torture had after-effects?

153

But see Convention on Refugees, supra note 10 (applying non-refoulement provisions
only to refugees).
154
Weissbordt & Hortreiter, supra note 150, at 7.
155
Id. at 7–8.
156
Id. at 8.
157
Id.
158
Torture and Diplomatic Assurances, 446, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploa
ds/2013/12/Alston-Goodman-Torture-and-Diplomatic-Assurances-International-Human-Right
s-OUP.pdf; see also Menendez, supra note 140, at 62.
159
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 3.1.
160
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CAT General Comment No. 1:
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22 (Refoulement and
Communication) (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter CAT General Comment No. 1].
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(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed? Has
the internal situation in respect of human rights altered?
(e) Has the author engaged in political or other activity
within or outside the State concerned which would appear to
make him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed
in danger of torture where he/she to be expelled, returned or
extradited to the State in question?
(f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author?
(g) Are there factual inconsistencies in the claim of the
author? If so, are they relevant?161
The risk of torture must be a personal, real, and foreseeable risk and must be
“assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion,” rather than
the enhanced burden of “highly probable.”162 A complainant at risk of being
returned to a state is not automatically guaranteed his or her wish of nonrefoulement simply because the state has a pattern of human rights
violations, including torture or cruel punishment. Likewise, a complainant at
risk of refoulement to a state without a history of flagrant human rights
violations will not automatically be denied protection. David Weissbrodt
and Isabel Hortrieter pointed out that the “substantial grounds” test is
evaluated both subjectively and objectively.163
There is a lack of jurisprudence as to whether Article 3 of the CAT refers
exclusively to refoulement in instances of torture or if it also includes the risk
of other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.164 Article 3.1
of the CAT specifically refers to “substantial grounds” for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.165 Fernando M. Marino
Menendez argued that the line between torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is slowly dissolving in this context.166 In
assessing the risk of torture suffered by the complainant in H.K v.
Switzerland167 in 2013, the Committee indicated that other cruel, inhuman or
161

Id. at 2.
Id.
163
Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 150, at 12.
164
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 3.1; Menendez, supra note 140, at 68.
165
Convention Against Torture, supra note 6, art. 3.1.
166
Menendez, supra note 140, at 68–69. Likewise, the Committee in General Comment 2
“stressed that because it can be extremely difficult to identify the threshold between illtreatment and torture, it considers ‘the prohibition of ill-treatment to be likewise nonderogable under the Convention and its prevention to be an effective and non-derogable
measure.’ ” Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law,
20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 373, 380 (2008).
167
H.K. v. Switzerland, Communication No. 432/2010, Decision, U.N. Comm. Against
Torture (2013).
162
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degrading treatment or punishment would be substantial grounds for nonrefoulement. The Committee concluded, however, that the individual “ha[d]
not submitted any evidence supporting her claims of having been severely
ill-treated by the Ethiopian military prior to her arrival in Switzerland.”168 In
Fatou Sonko v. Spain,169 the Committee furthered this interpretation by
declaring that, “the prohibition of ill-treatment is absolute and . . . [it’s]
prevention is an effective and non-derogable measure.”170
In E.C. v. Switzerland171 the Committee considered a claim put forth by a
former member of the Gambian National Army who had involuntarily been
involved in a coup against the President of Gambia in 2006.172 The
complainant’s superior had ordered him to sever all lines of communication
within Gambia.173 The complainant contended that he followed the order out
of fear “of the potential consequences of refusal.”174 The coup eventually
failed, and the President of Gambia stated that “all those involved would be
severely punished.”175 After the complainant fled Gambia to Switzerland,
the complainant’s brother, who still resided in Gambia, was interrogated and
beaten in an effort to obtain information about the complainant’s
involvement with the coup. The Committee ruled that it would not be a
violation of Article 3 of the CAT for Switzerland to refuse asylum to the
complainant.176 The Committee reasoned that the complainant “had failed to
substantiate a present and personal risk of being tortured by state authorities
if returned,” because eight years had passed since the attempted coup, and
the complainant had put forth no evidence that the Gambian authorities were
still looking for him.177 Additionally, the burden of proof was on the
complainant, and the complainant offered no evidence or any “satisfactory
explanation for the contradictions noted by the authorities of the State party
during the asylum proceedings.”178
168
Menendez, supra note 140, at 68 (citing H.K. v. Switzerland, Communication No.
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In the context of non-refoulement, one defense often put forth by states is
that the individual in question was never technically in or under the control
of the state’s territory, and therefore, the state’s non-refoulement obligations
under the Convention were never triggered. Article 2.1 of the CAT charges
states with implementing measures to “prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.”179 Theodore Van Boven explained that General
Comment 2 of the CAT, when referring to the “scope of the ‘territory’,
includes situations where a state party exercises, directly or indirectly de jure
or de facto control over a person.”180 This is exemplified in Sonko v. Spain
in which Spanish Civil Guard Officers brought four swimming migrants
aboard their vessel and then forced them to jump into deep waters. In its
decision, the Committee “observe[d] that the Civil Guard officers exercised
control over the persons on board the vessel and were therefore responsible
for their safety.”181
Countervailing to the purposes of the CAT, the United States
implemented a program during the 1960s and 1970s in which the United
States intercepted Haitian boats routed to the United States to undertake “a
preliminary screening of individuals to determine if they had credible
refugee claims.”182 Furthermore in 1992, the United States issued an
executive order stating that its non-refoulement obligations did not extend
“outside U.S. land territory.”183 In the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council Inc.184 in 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the United States’
policy of returning vessels carrying Haitian migrants to Haiti “without any
consideration of their possible refugee status.”185 This decision was highly
criticized in a dissent by Justice Henry Blackmun as well as in the 1997
majority decision in Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States,
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which concluded that the act of bringing migrants on board a U.S. vessel
essentially brought the migrants within U.S. jurisdiction.186
IV. AUSTRALIA VIOLATED THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
It is evident that Australia has violated Articles 3 and 16 of the
Convention Against Torture in regards to non-refoulement and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by applying the previous
jurisprudence.
A. The Murder of Reza Barati and the Subsequent Torture of Eyewitnesses
Violated the Convention Against Torture
Though the exact events leading up to the death of Reza Barati and the
subsequent torture of eyewitnesses remain unclear, one thing is certain: both
events violated Australia’s obligations under the Convention Against Torture.
First, it must be determined whether the acts themselves amounted to
either torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The death of Barati may not amount to torture in the traditional sense of the
word, but there is something to be said about the poor conditions he endured
while at the Manus Island detention center, such as locked fences, armed
guards, and inadequate lighting and ventilation services. The Committee
Against Torture itself has previously deemed lack of bedding, inability to
exercise, and being exposed to smoke as cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.187 Surely, the conditions that Barati repeatedly
faced on Manus Island fell into this category.
Additionally, the circumstances surrounding Barati’s death constituted
cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment, or punishment. Barati was beaten with
a stick embedded with nails and had a rock subsequently thrown down on his
head by detention center employees. Barati’s physical and mental suffering
prior to his death and the additional circumstance of his being a migrant are
analogous to the Committee’s finding against Spain in Sonko v. Spain.188 If
186
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this type of behavior does not amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, it is difficult to ascertain what exactly would meet
these standards.
An even clearer case of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment is the treatment reportedly received by two
eyewitnesses of Reza Barati’s death. These two individuals were tied to
chairs and threated with rape, violence, and criminal prosecution in an effort
to force them to retract their statements concerning the incident. They were
threatened further when it was revealed they would be testifying in court
against the perpetrators. This is the sort of intimidation and behavior the
CAT was specifically aimed at preventing when it was originally drafted.
The broadening interpretation of the CAT supports these findings as well.
Second, it is necessary to evaluate whether these incidents were “inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”189 Initially, one might
argue the perpetrators at the Manus Island detention center are not public
officials or persons acting in an official capacity for purposes of the CAT
because the operations of the Manus Island detention center are
subcontracted by the Australian government to private security firms. The
Australian government has contended that this shields it from liability
because these employees are not public officials or acting pursuant to
government orders.
The interpretation that negates liability for Australia cannot be allowed.
Though the Australian government did not directly participate in these
incidents, it was responsible for the health and well-being of these detainees,
and an argument can be made that the employees of G4S were acting in an
official capacity due to the firm’s contract with the Australian government.
It has already been established that a government cannot do indirectly what it
is prohibited from doing directly.190
Australia cannot escape liability simply because it chose to subcontract
the management of the Manus Island detention center. At the time of
contracting with G4S, the Australian government was aware of the numerous
complaints against the private security firm, yet allowed the firm to take over
operations of the Manus Island detention center. Liability for atrocities
committed by its subcontractors would incentivize Australia and other states
to continue or even expand the extent to which they subcontract routine
operations of the government. Holding the Australian government liable in
these specific incidents would encourage the state to be more proactive in its
189
190
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stance on and obligations concerning the Convention Against Torture. It
would require the government to take specific action when complaints of
abuse and torture are reported.
Furthermore, if the notion that G4S was operating in an official capacity
is not readily accepted, an argument can still be made that the Australian
government acquiesced in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment by not actively preventing the incidents and abuses
from taking place. It would prove extremely difficult for the Australian
government to deny it had any knowledge that such abuse and treatment was
taking place when the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human
Rights Watch have all published multiple reports recounting the treatment
and incidents occurring on Manus Island.
Furthermore, Australia’s lack of a bill or charter of rights can be partially
blamed for this acquiescence along with the Australian Court’s propensity to
not integrate Australia’s international obligations in the Court’s legal
opinions. The Australian government has a duty under the Convention
Against Torture to impose “formal and non-formal arrangements at the
domestic level to prevent torture from occurring within the State and its
territories.”191 These territories necessarily include the Manus Island
detention center, and Australia has failed to implement domestic laws to
combat the torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment that has consistently occurred there.
The Australian
government’s expansive legislation concerning offshore detention centers
and its refusal to allow irregular maritime arrivals the opportunity for asylum
in Australia have essentially forced these refugees into this position.
Australia has placed these refugees and asylum seekers in the situation to be
victims of abuse and torture.
B. Inadequate Screening and Return of Sri Lankan Aslum Seekers of the
Tamil Ethnicity
For Australia to have violated its non-refoulement obligations under the
CAT regarding its treatment of Sri Lankan asylum seekers, the asylum
seekers must have been in Australian territory, and there must have been
substantial grounds for believing the individual in question would be in
danger of being subjected to torture if returned to their State of origin. The
relevant factors must point to a personal, real, and foreseeable risk that goes
“beyond mere theory or suspicion,” rather than “highly probable.”192 It
191
192
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makes no difference whether Australia has deemed these individuals asylum
seekers, because the CAT encompasses the non-refoulement of all
individuals, not just refugees.
To begin, it must be determined whether the Sri Lankan asylum seekers
in question entered Australian territory, effectively implicating Australia’s
obligation of non-refoulement. Concerning the first set of Sri Lankan
asylum seekers who were intercepted on June 29, 2014, it is evident that
these individuals were in Australian territory. If credit is to be given to
Theodore Van Boven’s interpretation of the Convention Against Torture’s
General Comment No. 2, then de jure or de facto control of an individual
satisfies the CAT’s territorial requirement.193 Australia’s interception of
these individuals and their subsequent transportation to the Australian
mainland triggered Australia’s obligations under the CAT. Furthermore,
pursuant to the Committee’s decision in Sonko v. Spain, Australian vessels
flying the Australian flag essentially “exercised control over the persons on
board the vessel and were therefore responsible for their safety.”194
The same analytical process can be used to evaluate whether the second
set of Sri Lankan asylum seekers intercepted were within Australian territory
for purposes of the CAT. Once again, these individuals were intercepted by
Australian vessels. Relying on the Committee’s past decisions, including
Fatou Sonko v. Spain,195 and Theodore Van Boven’s196 elucidation of the
CAT’s General Comment No. 2, non-refoulement obligations were initiated
the moment these Australian vessels brought the individuals in question on
board.
Next, it must be determined whether there were substantial grounds for
believing these Sri Lankan asylum seekers were in danger of being subjected
to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For
purposes of this Note, this analysis will only explore if there were substantial
grounds for believing the second set of Sri Lankan asylum seekers were in
danger of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. This is because the first set of Sri Lankan asylum
seekers discussed were transferred to a detention center on Nauru. Thus,
many of these individuals’ current refoulement status is unknown. In
contrast, the second set of Sri Lankan asylum seekers were transferred
directly to Sri Lankan authorities.
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When attempting to determine whether the refoulement of an individual
would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the CAT, General Comment 1197
provides guidance to clarify and aid States. First, a State should investigate
whether there is “evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.”198 In this particular instance, the authoritarian
regime in Sri Lanka abuses and persecutes Sri Lankans of Tamil origin
because of the long-standing feud between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
government. The Sri Lankan government has a consistent history of killing
civilians associated with the LTTE and the Tamil minority. Although a
State’s history of flagrant human rights violations is not indicative of a
substantial risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment for an individual who happens to be returned to the state in
question, it is a relevant factor in the present case in favor of nonrefoulement.
Importance is also placed on the current human rights situation in the
state from which the individual in question hailed.199 In Sri Lanka, the Tamil
minority still faces abuse, persecution, and discrimination by the
authoritarian government.200 Individuals with ties to the former LTTE are
sought out and abused. Individuals who speak out against these abuses, such
as lawyers and human rights advocates, are also persecuted and abused. It is
evident that these human rights violations are consistent and ongoing,
leading one to conclude that Sri Lanka is continually engaging in “gross,
flagrant or mass violations”201 of human rights to date.
A third inquiry regards whether the complainant “has been tortured or
maltreated by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity in the past.”202
This suggested factor is a bit more difficult to discern in the present case due
to the enhanced screening procedures put in place by the Australian
government. This screening process, given only to Sri Lankan individuals,
consists of a mere four questions and cannot possibly give an accurate
depiction of the individual’s current state of affairs. These four questions are
inadequate in determining if an individual is a genuine asylum seeker or at
risk for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
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if returned to Sri Lanka. Furthermore, these questions only seek to
determine whether these individuals are genuine refugees under the Refugee
Convention.203 Pursuant to its obligations under the CAT, Australia must not
return any individual when there are substantial grounds for believing that
individual may face torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment if returned. Australia’s four-question screening of Sri Lankans
arriving by boat more likely than not fails in this regard because the
questions are designed to determine refugee status only.
Additionally, a State should look for “medical or other independent
evidence to support a claim by the author that he/she has been tortured or
maltreated in the past.”204 Once again, the enhanced screening process to
which Sri Lankan asylum seekers are subjected fails to take this information
into account. These individuals arrive with little more than the clothes on
their backs, much less folders containing medical records from past abuses
and mistreatment. Along with this, General Comment No. 1 puts forth the
question as to whether the complainant has “engaged in political or other
activity within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make
him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of
torture,” if returned to that State.205 The Australian government fails to
obtain this sort of information and also has no way to determine the
credibility of the author and if their claims—if they make any—are factually
consistent.
Although the factors contained in General Comment 1206 are neither
exhaustive nor dispositive, they provide a starting point from which to
evaluate the grounds of whether to return an individual to the state from
which he or she came.
The “substantial grounds” test should be evaluated both subjectively and
objectively, but Australia’s enhanced screening procedures make this
extremely difficult because of the inadequate nature of the questions asked.
Furthermore, it has been established that a complainant before the
Committee carries the burden of proof in proving there are substantial
grounds for believing the complainant would be in danger of torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned. This is
simply what the Committee has established for complainants who lodge a
complaint with the Committee. This is not the recognized burden for when
individuals arrive in states seeking protection. It would be extremely
burdensome to require individuals who are fleeing from persecution and
203
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torture to carry documentation with them as evidence of their torture or cruel
punishment. Instead, the state arguably has an obligation to adequately
investigate whether the individual in question falls within the State’s nonrefoulement obligations under the CAT.
Australia’s policy of “enhanced screening” does not effectively screen Sri
Lankan asylum seekers to determine if they are at risk of enduring torture or
other cruel, inhuman degrading treatment or torture if returned to the State
from which they traveled.
V. CONCLUSION
As individuals flee parts of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the
Americas to surrounding states that are party to the Convention Against
Torture, that state is obligated neither to torture nor to inflict upon that
person other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Nor may
States return any individual to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that individual may be subjected to torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This obligation is
non-derogable, and states party to the CAT may not digress from this
obligation for any reason.207
Australia’s treatment of Reza Barati, along with the witnesses to his
death, is clearly a violation of Articles 1 and 16 of the CAT.208 The fact that
Australia contracted the operations of the Manus Island detention center to
G4S does not, and should not, absolve Australia of liability under the CAT.
While awaiting determination of their asylum status, these individuals were
under the protection and control of the Australian government, and the
Australian government failed them. Holding states liable in situations such
as these will encourage them to take a more proactive approach in
monitoring the treatment of detainees.
Though it is not as discernible whether Australia violated its obligations
under Article 3 of the CAT regarding the refoulement of Sri Lankan asylum
seekers, it is undisputed that the Australian government owed some duty to
these individuals in attempting to determine the individual’s risk of torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to the
State from which they came. Australia’s enhanced screening of Sri Lankan
asylum seekers is not an effective procedure to determine the risks these
individuals possibly face. Though it might be initially burdensome to enact a
more thorough screening process, those disadvantages are outweighed by the
207
208
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risk of` returning individuals to States where there are substantial grounds for
believing the individuals will be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.
Holding signatories of the CAT to these standards will not only protect
individuals at risk, such as refugees and asylum seekers, but will also provide
more oversight and compliance with basic human rights.

